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FREE EDITION / Simulation / 6 MIN

The Cooperation Window

Six rounds, two choices, one visible response rule. Watch how today’s choice changes tomorrow’s partner.

By the Oddoscope editorial desk. Times include reflection and are estimates.

Original optical evidence illustration

A small model with visible rules

A fictional deterministic six-round game. The partner starts by sharing, then repeats your last choice, except for an announced withholding mistake in round 3. The mistake does not change the memory rule: round 4 still copies your round 3 choice. Both scores and the full payoff table are visible. There is no random personality or hidden test.

What to notice

Inspect your score, their score, the shared total and mutual-share rounds. A private gain and a shared gain can disagree. This finite, announced game omits communication, enforcement, unequal resources and uncertainty about the ending. It does not prove how people behave or identify a universally best strategy. Ask which assumption you would change before applying any lesson outside the model.

COOPERATION WINDOW / 1 OF 6

A fictional deterministic six-round game. The partner starts by sharing, then repeats your last choice, except for an announced withholding mistake in round 3. The mistake does not change the memory rule: round 4 still copies your round 3 choice. Both scores and the full payoff table are visible. There is no random personality or hidden test.

Your points
0
Partner points
0
Shared total
0
Mutual-share rounds
0

Payoff (you, partner): share/share 3/3; share/withhold 0/5; withhold/share 5/0; withhold/withhold 1/1.

    Round 1

    Share or withhold. The partner normally repeats your previous choice, beginning with share. In round 3 only, a scheduled delivery mistake makes the partner withhold.

    Payoffs (you, partner): share/share (3,3); share/withhold (0,5); withhold/share (5,0); withhold/withhold (1,1). The game ends after round 6, with no additional reward.

    Sources and editorial notes

    Axelrod & Hamilton — The evolution of cooperation (1981) — Primary model of repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma interactions. Our finite, announced six-round game is different and does not establish a universally best human strategy.

    Original Oddoscope writing and artwork. All scenarios and numbers are fictional teaching examples; sources are credited, not reproduced.

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